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90-985.ZS
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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
BRAY et al. v. ALEXANDRIA WOMEN'S HEALTH
CLINIC et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the fourth circuit
No. 90-985. Argued October 15, 1991-Reargued October 6, 1992-
Decided January 13, 1993
Respondents, abortion clinics and supporting organizations, sued to
enjoin petitioners, an association and individuals who organize and
coordinate antiabortion demonstrations, from conducting demonstra-
tions at clinics in the Washington, D. C., metropolitan area. The
District Court held that, by conspiring to deprive women seeking
abortions of their right to interstate travel, petitioners had violated
the first clause of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3), which prohibits conspiracies
to deprive ``any person or class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws'';
ruled for respondents on their pendent state-law claims of trespass
and public nuisance; as relief on these three claims, enjoined petition-
ers from trespassing on, or obstructing access to, specified clinics;
and, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988, ordered petitioners to pay
respondents attorney's fees and costs on the 1985(3) claim. The
Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1.The first clause of 1985(3) does not provide a federal cause of
action against persons obstructing access to abortion clinics.
Pp.2-14.
(a)Respondents have not shown that opposition to abortion
qualifies alongside race discrimination as an ``otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus [underlying] the conspirators'
action,'' as is required under Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,
102, in order to prove a private conspiracy in violation of 1985(3)'s
first clause. Respondents' claim that petitioners' opposition to
abortion reflects an animus against women in general must be
rejected. The ``animus'' requirement demands at least a purpose that
focuses upon women by reason of their sex, whereas the record
indicates that petitioners' demonstrations are not directed specifically
at women, but are intended to protect the victims of abortion, stop
its practice, and reverse its legalization. Opposition to abortion
cannot reasonably be presumed to reflect a sex-based intent; there
are common and respectable reasons for opposing abortion other than
a derogatory view of women as a class. This Court's prior decisions
indicate that the disfavoring of abortion, although only women engage
in the activity, is not ipso facto invidious discrimination against
women as a class. Pp.3-9.
(b)Respondents have also not shown that petitioners ``aimed at
interfering with rights'' that are ``protected against private, as well
as official, encroachment,'' a second prerequisite to proving a private
conspiracy in violation of 1985(3)'s first clause. Carpenters v. Scott,
463 U.S. 825, 833. Although the right to interstate travel is consti-
tutionally protected against private interference in at least some
contexts, Carpenters makes clear that a 1985(3) private conspiracy
must be ``aimed at'' that right. Ibid. That was not established here.
Although respondents showed that substantial numbers of women
travel interstate to reach the clinics in question, it was irrelevant to
petitioners' opposition whether or not such travel preceded the
intended abortions. Moreover, as far as appears from the record,
petitioners' proposed demonstrations would erect ``actual barriers to
. . . movement'' only intrastate. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 60,
n.6. Respondents have conceded that this intrastate restriction is
not applied discriminatorily against interstate travelers, and the right
to interstate travel is therefore not implicated. Ibid. Nor can
respondents' 1985(3) claim be based on the right to abortion, which
is a right protected only against state interference and therefore
cannot be the object of a purely private conspiracy. See Carpenters,
supra, at 833. Pp.9-14.
(c)The dissenters err in considering whether respondents have
established a violation of 1985(3)'s second, ``hindrance'' clause, which
covers conspiracies ``for the purpose of preventing or hindering . . .
any State . . . from giving or securing to all persons . . . the equal
protection of the laws.'' A ``hindrance''-clause claim was not stated
in the complaint, was not considered by either of the lower courts,
was not contained in the questions presented on certiorari, and was
not suggested by either party as a question for argument or decision
here. Nor is it readily determinable that respondents have estab-
lished a ``hindrance''-clause violation. The language in the first
clause of 1985(3) that is the source of the Griffin animus require-
ment also appears in the ``hindrance'' clause. Second, respondents'
``hindrance'' ``claim'' would fail unless the ``hindrance'' clause applies
to private conspiracies aimed at rights constitutionally protected only
against official encroachment. Cf. Carpenters. Finally, the district
court did not find that petitioners' purpose was to prevent or hinder
law enforcement. Pp.14-20.
2.The award of attorney's fees and costs under 1988 must be
vacated because respondents were not entitled to relief under
1985(3). However respondents' 1985(3) claims were not, prior to
this decision, ``wholly insubstantial and frivolous,'' Bell v. Hood, 327
U.S. 678, 682-683, so as to deprive the District Court of subject-
matter jurisdiction over the action. Consideration should be given on
remand to the question whether the District Court's judgment on the
state-law claims alone can support the injunction that was entered.
Pp.20-21.
914 F.2d 582, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.
Scalia, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist,
C. J., and White, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined. Kennedy, J.,
filed a concurring opinion. Souter, J., filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part. Stevens, J., filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined. O'Connor, J., filed
a dissenting opinion, in which Blackmun, J., joined.